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Social science perspectives on natural hazards risk
and uncertainty
s. cornell and m. jackson
15.1 Introduction
Many of the most pressing challenges for uncertainty analysis in the context of natural
hazards relate to the human dimensions of risk. Earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides
and many other hazards are themselves, sensu stricto, simply events in the natural
world. How they come to be classed as hazardous, however, is a consequence of social
factors which translate their happening as events for collective experience. Designating
these event hazards as risks is a further conceptual step that invokes temporal awareness of
hazards from past experience. Risks, and the uncertainties around their prediction,
thus emerge from complex spatial and temporal interrelationships of natural and social
worlds. Understanding the complexities of these interrelationships between natural and
social domains is vital, because the analyses of risks, the processes of designing and
managing responses to them and the nature and scope of their uncertainties are part and
parcel of how risk itself comes to be constituted as a societal ‘matter of concern’
(Latour, 2004a).
Risks are usually understood as threats to people. Increasingly they are even seen as
opportunities to be exploited. Natural hazards become risky as a function of how they are
considered problematic within the systems or ‘assemblages’ (see Çalişkan and Callon,
2010) of which people are a part. A volcano on earth is hazardous, and presents risks in
numerous ways in many human situations, such as air travel or nearby habitation, and so on.
In contrast, a volcano on Saturn’s moon, Titan, is not a hazard, unless it becomes incorpo-
rated into a socially interested assemblage and presents a threat to a social activity, for
instance, interfering with the function of a space probe. Potential risks and uncertainties
presented by such interactions between humans and the natural environment are, therefore,
products of how hazards are incorporated into social systems. It is widely accepted within
contemporary social science that the way that modern societies negotiate and conceive risk
is a function of how risk is itself a manufactured product of speciﬁc industrial, technological
and scientiﬁc capacities (Beck, 1992, 1999). Risks become manifest for us in new ways
precisely through the capacities afforded to us by our ever-changing social behaviours and
capabilities. Risks, then, are labile functions of changing social descriptions and values. As a
result, social research is of central importance to the framing and understanding of
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contemporary risk and uncertainty. However, mainstream risk research has primarily con-
centrated on environmental and technical dimensions of risk, as the subject matter of this
book attests.
In this chapter, we explore the emerging rationale for a more comprehensive engagement
with social science expertise and techniques, in assessing risks associated with a wide range
of socio-environmental or socio-technical hazards (e.g. Macnaghten et al., 2005; Klinke and
Renn, 2006; Demeritt, 2008; LWEC, 2008). Key features of this engagement are the
opening up of both interdisciplinary and societal dialogues, and a more experimental,
self-conscious and provisional approach to identifying responses, recognising that multiply
optimised solutions may not exist. The recently created international programme for
Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (ICSU-IRDR) is a prime example:
The Programme Plan breaks new ground in that it calls for multiple starting points: natural sciences;
socio-economic sciences; engineering sciences; health sciences; and the policy-making/decision-
making arena. There is need for full interaction and involvement of these groups, with each being
clear what it needs from the other groups. It is also necessary to work across the interfaces, with
continual re-examination as the Programme proceeds. The overall goal of contributing to a reduction in
the impacts of hazards on humanity would require some relatively non-traditional research approaches.
(ICSU, 2008: 8)
As we will see, this kind of new engagement across disciplines and the channelling of
academic research into policy and society present radical new challenges for the research
process. Key among these is the need to integrate a greater range of expert evidence into the
suite of risk calculation and response strategies. In this chapter we refer to innovative
integrative studies that exemplify how varieties of traditional and non-traditional expertise
(in the physical science, social scientiﬁc and non-academic communities) shape the pro-
duction of new knowledges about environmental risks.
To close, we will focus brieﬂy on the capacities for academics to be proactive in shaping
society’s responses, amidst demands for greater involvement by scientists in hazards policy
(HM Government, 2011; Royal Society, 2006). If social scientiﬁc and non-traditional
learning can be better incorporated in the interdisciplinary research design and analysis of
knowledge about natural hazards, then scientiﬁc actors will also be better prepared for the
demands of political application and social action.
15.1.1 Setting the scope
Insight from social science can and, we argue, should – because it already does, even if it is
not always explicitly acknowledged – add to our understanding of natural hazards risks and
uncertainties. Although a great deal of research into risk and uncertainty has been mobilised
in the social sciences (for example, Beck, 1992; Callon et al., 2009; Douglas, 1992; Douglas
and Wildavsky, 1982; Giddens, 1999; Luhman, 1993; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006),
arguably the crossover of insights to the parallel community in the natural and physical
sciences is still wanting. Technocratic models of scientiﬁc knowledge production, risk
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assessment and risk communication prevail in the everyday assumptions and practices of
publics, scientists, policy-makers and the media (Hulme, 2009: 102–104; Millstone, 2009;
Shrader-Frechette, 2010). This is despite many long arguments about the value complexities
of scientiﬁc knowledge production and the co-determinate interfaces of science and policy
(see, among many examples, Etkin and Ho, 2007; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Jasanoff,
1990; Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Turnpenny et al., 2011; National Research Council, 1996).
While our main focus in this chapter is on the qualitative and theoretical approaches that
integrate social, technical and environmental systems, as will become clear, this also implies
a thorough-going critique of technocratic forms of knowledge production, including those in
the social scientiﬁc arena. Technocratic models assume that objective and value-free knowl-
edge produced by technically literate experts is both necessary and sufﬁcient for policy
decision-making. Related ‘top-down’ knowledge formation processes like so-called ‘deci-
sionist’ models (see Hulme, 2009: 100–102; Millstone, 2009: 625; Weber, 1946) similarly
privilege the role of experts in deﬁning the terms and frames for what counts as risk-relevant
knowledge. Despite surface appearances of doing otherwise, such efforts often unwittingly
reproduce technocratic biases by emphasising the role of social science expertise in the
communication of scientiﬁc knowledge to those affected by hazards (see, for instance,
Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 2011). We argue, like Hulme (2009) and others, for a more ‘co-
productive’ model of knowledge formation which seeks, in open forms of democratic and
public dialogue with scientists and advisors, the means to embed risk-relevant values,
rationalities, world-views and knowledges of those affected by hazards in the production
of what counts as scientiﬁc knowledge. We even go further to suggest, by way of offering
some limited examples, that how risk and hazards are understood, rationalised and commu-
nicated is a function of extremely complex human and non-human assemblages of interest.
Indeed, the agencies at play in decision forecasting are distributed products of these socio-
technical assemblages, and include humans, their material environments, their resonant
politics, particular techniques and resultant world-views. In order to effectively understand,
mitigate and possibly intervene in hazardous environments we need to take account
holistically of these ‘knowledge ecologies’ which, at a minimum, demand that risk-relevant
knowledge is co-produced from its heterogeneous contexts (Farrell, 2011). Furthermore,
where once strict academic boundaries governed the non-human and human (and hence the
social), increasingly such lines are becoming blurred, expanding the remit of social explo-
ration (see Escobar, 2008; Latour, 2004b). New developments in the sciences of life and
environment compel physical scientists to direct attention to the human dimensions of the
issues that interest them. They also demand that social scientists themselves reconﬁgure
their own assumptions, politics and starting points, and begin to see the social as a product of
hybrid collectives beyond simply human action.We argue that such ‘socio-natural’ evidence
and experience (to use the term of Whatmore, 2002) can provide constitutive grounds for
important operational insights that help us in framing and responding to risk and uncertainty
in natural hazards research.
The recognition of socio-natural co-implication and imbrication builds from previous
social scientiﬁc treatments of risk. The sociologist Ulrich Beck, in his inﬂuential books Risk
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Society (1992) and World Risk Society (1999), argued that, for modern social and political
subjects, the risks that arise from scientiﬁc and industrial modernity constitute a new means
of social change. He emphasised how contemporary social shifts away from loyalty and trust
in institutions and traditional social structures, and towards science and technology and
liberalised economic structures, shaped the emergence of risk as a key facet of contemporary
life. As a result, risk becomes a function of greater individualism, and indeed, risk is the
product of social and technical modernity itself. Risks, deﬁned as the products of modern
industrial societies and their future-oriented perspectives and capabilities, are for Beck and
others (such as Giddens, 1999) key features of how modern societies understand and
organise themselves. The risks that concern us today, that in Beck’s words, ask us to
move ‘beyond a modernity of classical industrial design’ (1992: 10) are what Beck calls
‘manufactured uncertainties’ (Beck, 1999: 19–48). They are the product of things like
greater predictive capacities, increased industrialisation (pollution, stress), increased knowl-
edge about disease and risky behaviours (smoking, over-eating for instance), and the
capacity of technology and social action, to some extent at least, to create means – if within
always uncertain parameters – to assess and address these newfound risks (e.g. with climate
modelling, improved geological sensing, ﬂood course prediction, storm tracking, identiﬁ-
cation of disease and its spread). The social scientiﬁc focus since Beck’s work, then, has
been on analysing how such social changes impact upon individual and collective strategies
or abilities to deal with what are labelled risks and uncertainties (for example, Ericson et al.,
2000; O’Malley, 2004; Rose, 2006). People living in what have since come to be termed
‘risk societies’ ﬁnd their options are re-conﬁgured within complex, often market-led,
structures and forces, and, as a result, they are increasingly left to manage their own safety
and risk exposures. However, at the same time, the discourse of science – which is seen to
objectively describe the so-called ‘natural’ conditions of hazard, risk and its avoidance – has
become the key means by which risk is thinkable, and as such sets the context for risk and its
various politics (Giddens, 1999). The critical social sciences, then, have focused largely on
the politicisation of risk as a function of living in scientiﬁcally and economically mediated
risk societies.
In what follows, our approach is not to survey the extensive social scientiﬁc literature on
risk societies. We would not be able to do justice to that body of work in the available space,
and, we suspect, we would be misaddressing the communities of interest targeted in this
book. Instead, we describe some existing and emerging areas of research at the interfaces
between society and the natural environment, where a social understanding of risk and
uncertainty is being applied. The disciplinary divide in academia between science and social
science has meant that this is still a comparatively small area, and further methodological
developments are needed. We aim to ﬂag areas where researchers can bridge the divide and
attend to calls for greater and more productive collaborations around hazard risks and
uncertainties. We highlight three domains where social dimensions are already recognised
as important factors of uncertainty in natural hazard risk assessment and management
(discussed more fully in Section 15.3).
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The ﬁrst and most fundamental of these domains is in the framing of the problem itself.
The social sciences can shed important light on how the knowledge that pertains to hazards
and risks is framed, produced and implemented (see Collins and Evans, 2002). To date, risk
assessments have largely looked at the social and environmental components separately, so
we need to revisit how risk and uncertainty are typically constructed and addressed. While
we expect that the quantitative, applied models of complex systems that often frame
approaches to natural hazards risks and uncertainties will continue to play a vital role in
risk management, constraining the attempt to capture social perceptions and responses to
risks simply through quantitative modelling jeopardises the capacity to understand how
risks and uncertainties emerge from and are shaped by social and natural interactions
(see Odoni and Lane, 2010; Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis, 2007; Smil, 2003). Our capacity to
respond effectively to natural hazards may thus be blunted by an over-reliance on quanti-
ﬁcation. To see risk as a product of whole-system relations requires an understanding not
just of the natural hazard, but also of the interactions between environmental and human
systems (Figure 15.1). As we know, what is considered an acceptable or unacceptable risk
(and thus, a rational or irrational response) shifts with geographical, cultural, economic and
political context. Uncertainty, too, is a function of time and social expectation, translated and
acted upon by the societies and cultures through which it is modulated and becomes
meaningful. Thus, knowledge of the social and institutional systems operating in the context
of natural hazards is required, just as an understanding of the environmental and techno-
logical drivers and constraints of human choices that lead to risk exposure is also necessary.
Understanding and invoking the non-quantiﬁable aspects of risk and uncertainty lends a rich
and necessary picture to the resonance and application of natural hazards decisions.
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Figure 15.1 Socially mediated interactions between human society and its natural environment.
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A fuller characterisation of risks and uncertainties from a coupled socio-environmental
perspective necessarily involves a much wider range of epistemic inputs into the assessment
process than we often currently see. In addition to the customary inputs from economics and
political science, new research ﬁelds, approaches and dialogues within longer-established
disciplines are shaping the framing of risk and uncertainty. For instance, within sociology,
growing attention is being given to these issues in the ﬁelds of science and technology
studies and actor network theory, and in geography, ‘hybrid geographies’ are emerging,
which draw on both of these new sociological ﬁelds. Relevant research in psychology
includes prospect theory and plasticity; from philosophy comes game theory and assem-
blage theory. Input to environmental risk also comes from ethics and law (speciﬁcally, socio-
legal studies). Bringing this multidisciplinary knowledge together has become an important
aspect of assessing risks and addressing social responses to natural hazards. Signiﬁcantly,
there are widespread moves towards the engagement of communities of interest in deﬁning
the risk problem and agreeing how they prefer to manage the uncertainties, rather than
merely in accepting the proposed solutions. Their experience and knowledge makes them
‘contributory experts’ (Collins and Evans, 2007), whose voices are no less important than
those of the scientists bringing specialist technical expertise.
This takes us to the second domain where a social science perspective plays a vital role.
Like many other contemporary environmental issues, the societal risks linked to natural
hazards are particularly complex problems to understand, represent and communicate.
Uncertainty features prominently in the comprehensibility of environmental risks and their
communication to the people who will be affected. Better interdisciplinary engagement can
often help in shaping how scientiﬁc knowledge and understanding is communicated, received
and acted upon in non-scientiﬁc contexts – for example, in public understanding or policy
application (see Callon, 1999). Ensuring the effectiveness of science communication in the
context of environmental risks is a well-documented challenge (e.g. Brulle, 2010; Heath et al.,
2007;MacDonell et al., 2002; Sterman, 2011). However, while social research can shed useful
light on how best to communicate scientiﬁc uncertainty, for us what is signiﬁcant is that it can
also bring social and cultural perspectives to natural hazards science via methodological
processes that emphasise the ‘co-production of scientiﬁc knowledge’ through ‘knowledge
theoretic’ approaches (see Lane et al., 2011; Odoni and Lane, 2010). The scientiﬁc and
methodological implications for people’s access to, and constructions of, knowledge, and
thus how risks can be understood, translated across different contexts and managed, mark one
of the primary contributions of social research for natural hazards risk and uncertainty science.
Our third and ﬁnal domain is less commonly appreciated. While social scientiﬁc per-
spectives on scientiﬁc knowledge production are increasingly shaping how physical or ‘hard
scientiﬁc’ knowledge is produced (see, e.g. Odoni and Lane, 2010), they can also shape
what ‘the social’ itself comes to mean within changing contexts. Like the scientiﬁc, so the
social also changes and adapts through time and space. The rich and nuanced understanding
that social research can bring is an important component in responding to natural hazards
along the whole chronology of hazard identiﬁcation, avoidance, mitigation, adaptation and
post-event recovery. In this regard, we focus in this chapter on the social learning and actions
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at the collective and community levels; and on the systems of relations that shape how the
social is constituted and involved in the production of scientiﬁc knowledge about hazard
risks. There is already a considerable body of research into individuals’ perceptions of risk,
and psychological reasons for making choices (for example, see Kahneman et al., 1982;
Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Fox and Tversky, 1995; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). This
is not reviewed in depth here, but is covered in detail in Chapter 16. Instead, we will address
how understanding motivations and values inﬂuences the collective productions of, and
responses to, risk and uncertainty, and how these are deployed in natural hazard risk
management. Even when an understanding of the problem is ‘complete’, social choices –
as matters of concern – regarding what to do in response to the problem are often difﬁcult.
Issues of collective understanding, choice and human agency bring a different analytical
register to uncertainty, the latter of which is coming increasingly to the fore as the predictive
power of the scientiﬁc dimensions of risk assessment grows.
15.1.2 The social in the science
This chapter seeks a precarious balance. On the one hand we emphasise how social scientiﬁc
perspectives on hazard risks – as arising primarily from events that impact people – can
contribute to effective scientiﬁc production, communication and implementation strategies.
The social sciences, of course, do have a crucial role to play in the dissemination and
mediation of knowledge between and across interested parties and domains. But, critically,
on the other hand, social science is not a ‘bolt-on’ whereby so-called objective scientiﬁc truth
is disseminated to affected audiences with the help of socially literate intermediaries, although
it is too often regarded, unfortunately, in this way by many implicit and explicit technocratic
approaches (see, for instance, Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 2011). Critical social analyses need to be
woven into the fabric of research design from the outset. Contemporary social analysis, since
at least the 1970s and what is known as ‘the cultural turn’ (Bonnell et al., 1999), has been
engaged in analysing how scientiﬁc discourses and practices are themselves part of the entire
constitution of our physical and risk environments. As we illustrated above, many risks are
only risks because they are products ofmodern social and scientiﬁc practices (see Beck, 1999).
In addition, through its development of new forms of evidence and predictive capacity,
scientiﬁc practice and knowledge-making is constantly producing new parameters of what
risk means, and thus moulding the ever-changing landscapes of uncertainty. As a result, how
evidence is constructed is a product of the various communities and interests in which it is
applied and made meaningful. Van Asselt and Rotmans (2002: 77) broadly summarise the
consequence of this often vexing and polarising philosophical fact with two interrelated
claims: ‘Science is not a purely objective, value-free activity of discovery: science is a creative
process in which social and individual values interfere with observation, analysis and inter-
pretation’, and ‘Knowledge is not equivalent with truth and certainty.’
We suggest that in order to better integrate natural hazards research to efﬁcacious social
outcomes, understanding how evidence and its applications are always already products of
508 S. Cornell and M. Jackson
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particular interested communities can go a long way to addressing scientiﬁc issues of risk
and its translation, reception and application.
But, interdisciplinary alliances are not consequence-free. Balancing social and scientiﬁc
demands requires signiﬁcant work on both sides of the knowledge-production process.
Social science and physical science are almost always changed, sometimes quite radically,
by becoming co-implicated with one another. By bringing social scientiﬁc research,
insights, and methods into natural and physical hazards research, the physical sciences
must open themselves to experimental processes with new scientiﬁc actors and radical
modes of knowledge production. To illustrate this requirement and its beneﬁts, we refer in
this chapter to a recent UK research project on natural hazards risk, which exempliﬁes just
such transformative work. Understanding Environmental Knowledge Controversies
(UEKC) aimed to integrate specialist physical science, social science and non-science actors
within evidence generation, analytic and response processes in order to develop new
approaches to ﬂood risk forecasting and communication. UEKC produced scientiﬁc and
social scientiﬁc knowledge, integrated models and policy-relevant ﬁndings from various
social engagements in the co-production of environmental science. The project, for us,
stands as a landmark in integrated scientiﬁc analysis, and an exemplar of the radical changes
to natural science and hazard processes, and vice versa, that social analyses can and do
bring. As the UEKC project attests, both natural science and social science are changed by
their fundamental re-engagement with one another.
In writing this chapter, we started out by entreating the physical science community to be
more sensitive and receptive to the insights that the social sciences provide. Crucially,
however, as also evidenced by the UEKC project, the social sciences must also become
much more attuned to, and literate with, the signiﬁcant cutting-edge developments in the
physical and natural sciences. Sociology, politics, human geography and some branches of
the humanities are often far too parochial and unrigorous in their approach to contemporary
developments within the natural sciences. Signiﬁcant time and work is urgently required by
many qualitative social researchers to understand the rigours and subtleties of scientiﬁc
knowledge production. Critical social scientists are often far too quick to dismiss scientiﬁc
approaches as positivist, reductive and simplistic. Such reactionary judgements are, today,
quite often wrong and certainly not mutually beneﬁcial. So while physical science must
open itself to the indubitable fact that science is a social, historical, political and cultural
product, so too must social researchers also educate themselves in the thorough delicacies of
formal and physical research. Both will beneﬁt as a result.
15.2 The knowledge challenge
15.2.1 Integrating knowledge
Quantitative approaches are essential components in the characterisation of risks. Much
research has focused on quantifying and modelling the physical and material (including
economic) elements of natural hazards, as outlined in the other chapters of this book. There
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has also been substantial progress towards predictive approaches in many areas, often
combining real-time earth observation from monitoring or satellite imaging with computer
models. Yearley (1999) has explored this trend from a sociological perspective, proposing
that much more consultation and participation are needed at the stage of model develop-
ment, especially for models that are applied to public policy.
Yet this is more than just an issue of public understanding of science. The multiple
uncertainties that pertain to human vulnerabilities to natural hazards – which include social,
ethical and political elements – mean that quantitative approaches are incomplete and
internally fraught in so far as they can represent and intervene effectively in the world.
The main approaches for quantitative integration draw on methods for representation and
assessment already described in the previous chapters, and are therefore only summarised
brieﬂy here. Key sources of uncertainty relate to: the quality or quantity of input data; the
selection or deﬁnition of model parameters; different model structures and resolvability; the
representation of functional relations; and the degree of model ‘completeness’ or abstraction
from reality. We also know that quantitative models are themselves fundamentally limited.
As Oreskes (2003: 13) writes, ‘Models can never fully specify the systems that they
describe, and therefore their predictions are always subject to uncertainties that we cannot
fully specify.’ But although numerical models never can provide deterministic predictions,
this does not preclude adaptive responses to perceived risk. For instance, Dessai et al. (2009)
argue that the fundamental limits to prediction should not obviate risk-attentive decision-
making. Quite the opposite – they argue that ‘decision-making is less likely to be con-
strained by epistemological limits and therefore more likely to succeed than an approach
focused on optimal decision-making predicated on predictive accuracy’ (Dessai et al. 2009:
64; emphasis added).
Improving information can inform policy decisions about risk, but the availability of
information or data is not in itself the basis for reaching or justifying those decisions, as the
increasing complexity of numerical models would sometimes lead us to believe. Therefore,
how this information is packaged and applied as data is signiﬁcant. We move below to
describe how the importance of qualitative information emerges through an awareness of the
limitations of quantitative data.
15.2.2 Qualifying quantiﬁcation
Data issues abound in quantitative social research, as in the physical sciences. Economic
data are available from diverse sources on trade, industrial production, household consump-
tion, government expenditure and so on. Typically, social data are obtained from population
and household surveys (such as the annual US Survey of Income and Program Participation1
and the UK General Household Survey2). Demographic and economic data, and the use of
spatial analysis methods, help elucidate questions such as a population’s exposure to the
hazard, or a nation’s dependence on sectors affected by the hazard. As in most
1 www.census.gov. 2 www.statistics.gov.uk.
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data-dependent situations, uncertainty is associated with the challenges of scaling and reso-
lution; the non-synchroneity of different datasets; the representativeness or otherwise of
population sampling; and the necessary splitting or aggregation of datasets in order to obtain
usable spatial or temporal coverage. There is a huge body of literature on social data handling
and statistics, outlining reﬁnements that are designed to reduce the uncertainty in the applica-
tion of the data. For example, Davern et al. (2006) outline approaches for constructing synthetic
variables from publicly available datasets so that estimates can bemade of the standard errors of
the original surveys, an important factor for the use and reuse of social data. Zintzaras et al.
(1997) describe methods for deriving individual estimates from household-level data, address-
ing another instance where the available data do not provide the desired information.
With regard to modelling, there has been a steady evolution from essentially actuarial
approaches for estimating risk, which apply algorithms based on observed relationships
between the hazard incidence and the societal impact (usually measured in money terms), to
simulation modelling and probabilistic approaches that address the dynamics and the
multiple causal factors in the human dimensions of risk. These models are generally termed
‘integrated assessment models’ (Table 15.1). Often they consist of linked physical or
environmental and economics modules. Such models are widely used for regional and
global climate impacts assessment, and have also been applied to socio-environmental
Table 15.1 Tools in use in interdisciplinary risk and uncertainty research
Approach and technique Context and examples of application
Qualitative or semi-quantitative approaches to uncertainty identiﬁcation:
Uncertainty tables help in the systematic
elicitation and evaluation of uncertainties,
often presented as a preliminary step before
‘better’ quantiﬁcation is undertaken.
European Food Safety Authority (2006); UK
Food & Environment Research Agency
(Hart et al., 2010)
Multi-criteria analysis for decision support,
based on multi-attribute utility theory or
other forms of ranking and optimisation.
Industrial disasters (Levy and Gopalakrishnan,
2009); sustainability of water systems
(Ashley et al., 2005); climate risk (Brown
and Corbera, 2003); air quality problems
(Phillips and Stock 2003)
Decision-mapping, where the goal is not to zero
in on ‘the answer’ but to display (and discuss)
the breadth of views on alternative actions.
Nanotechnology, genetically modiﬁed crops
(Stirling and Mayer, 2001)
Combined approaches or multi-stage procedures (qualitative-quantitative synthesis):
Integrated assessments – most are fully
quantitative, such as impacts models or
quantitative risk assessment consisting of
hazards models coupled to econometric
models.
Flood risk (e.g. the RASPmodel used in the UK
Foresight Future Flooding project, Evans et
al., 2004); global climate impacts (Costanza
et al., 2007)
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problems such as pollution (e.g. Hordijk, 1991; Gabbert, 2006) and coastal zone manage-
ment (e.g. Mokrech et al., 2009). Van Asselt and Rotmans (2002) have reviewed these
models, with particular attention to the management of uncertainties associated with them.
The paradox with these models is that the approximations and simpliﬁcations needed to
make a manageable, usable description of the real world mean that uncertainty arising in and
from the model does not have a direct relation to true uncertainty in the real world.
The result is a tension evident in the literature: quantitative approaches demand quantiﬁcation
of uncertainty, even when quantiﬁcation is impossible. The existence of indeterminacy, non-
linearity and other features of complex socio-natural systems is one area where quantiﬁcation is
Table 15.1 (cont.)
Approach and technique Context and examples of application
Mediated modelling: computational model
development in ongoing dialogue between
the modellers and stakeholders
Ecosystem services assessments, catchment
management (Antunes et al., 2006; Prell et
al., 2007)
Some forms of Bayesian synthesis Many health contexts (Roberts et al., 2002;
Voils et al., 2009)
Other participatory deliberative techniques for assessing risk and associated uncertainty:
Expert elicitation using a range of formal
methods (such as Delphi methods, multi-
criteria analysis, quantitative risk
assessments, and others from the list above)
to take account of ‘expert uncertainty’
Geohazards, nuclear installations (Aspinall,
2010); climate impacts (Titus and
Narayanan, 1996; Lenton et al., 2008)
Narrative approaches: horizon-scanning,
‘imagineering’ (narrative approaches
combined with education/training plans),
foresight exercises – usually engage expert
stakeholders. These methods are not
intended as formally predictive, unless as
enablers for a particular decision pathway
Former DTI’s Foresight programme, European
Science Foundation’s Forward Looks.
International Institute for Sustainable
Development; GECAFS food security
scenarios
Community participation methods: citizens’
juries and consensus conferences,
community visioning exercises,
backcasting – these techniques are often used
for obtaining community co-development
and acceptance of risk responses and action
plans. Experts/scientists can be involved to
varying extents.
Many examples at all scales, such as the World
Bank’s study by Solo et al. (2003)
Note: in this chapter we mention several of these approaches but do not expound on them nor critique
them. This table is included as an information resource, showing some of the integrative tools that are
in use that link the social and physical/natural sciences in risk management.
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constrained. Van der Sluijs (1996) and Batty and Torrens (2005) discuss the limitations of
integrated modelling and the lack of practically usable methodologies for handling disconti-
nuities and discrete random events or surprises. Quite often, the socially relevant issues of
culture, values, choice and so on are explicitly highlighted in discussions about the uncertainty
associated with integrated assessment (see also Eisenack et al., 2005; Reichert and Borsuk, 2005
for discussions about dealingwith complex socio-environmental system uncertainty in decision-
making). Nevertheless, usually the proposed uncertainty management solutions are rigidly
structural and assume a deterministic system: ‘more consistent interpretations of uncertain
parameters and inputs’ and ‘alternative model structures and equations’ (van Asselt and
Rotmans, 2002). Van der Sluijs (1996: 49) suggests that once the issues of inputs, parameters,
and equations are dealt with, attention should turn to ‘model completeness’, where model
intercomparisons and competition between modelling groups would provide the impetus for
reducing the remaining uncertainty arising from model incompleteness. Yet a little earlier in the
same article, he expresses his misgivings about adding more and more to models:
The solution of unknowns cannot simply be ‘let’s put every single detail that we know in the computer
and let’s hope that something shows up’. In our view, what is needed for scientiﬁc progress is to ask the
right questions, not to produce an endless stream of ‘what-if answers’. In that sense computers are
useless, because they cannot ask questions, they only produce answers.
(van der Sluijs, 1996: 39)
In short, quantiﬁcations and model representations are necessarily reductive, simpliﬁed
forms of evidential understanding. Even if these are not inherently inimical to societal
application, they are at least made more complicated by social considerations. To understand
socio-environmental risk and uncertainty, social considerations must be understood both to
contextualise and frame any quantitative application.
Indeed, uncertainties expose the fundamental limits of quantitative models. How quanti-
tative models are parameterised and applied is only ever subjective (Oreskes and Belitz,
2001). Once developed in and for one site, it is often the case that models cannot travel to
other contexts (Konikow and Bredehoeft, 1992). And, given that models are necessarily
simpliﬁed representations, problems with the boundary conditions around prediction are
often easily exacerbated and magniﬁed the larger or more complex the model gets (Pilkey
and Pilkey-Jarvis, 2007). As Oreskes explains,
the more we strive for realism by incorporating as many as possible of the different processes and
parameters that we believe to be operating in the system, the more difﬁcult it is for us to know if our
tests of the model are meaningful. A complex model may be more realistic, yet it is ironic that as we
add more factors to a model, the certainty of its predictions may decrease even as our intuitive faith in
the model increases.
(Oreskes 2003: 13)
In the next section we address how any description, whether quantitative or qualitative,
social or physical, necessarily appeals to simpliﬁed representations of the systems described,
explained and predicted. Such limitation is not a failure of description or analysis as such,
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but it does demand – as recent social science has been at pains to explore – that knowledge
production needs to become much more attuned to its own constitution and application.
Doing so, and doing it well, involves subjecting the work to a continuous and always
exploratory and self-reﬂexive process, but it produces knowledges and meanings that are
much more democratically aware, transparent and responsive to their various publics.
15.2.3 Systems, models, stories
Many consider that human society, conceived as a purposive system that reacts to the
knowledge it is given in pursuit of its goals – or indeed as a purposeful system that
intentionally deﬁnes and adapts its goals (Ackoff and Emery, 1972) – cannot be considered
adequately from a purely quantitative, mechanistic point of view. Concepts like community
life, behaviour and the mind cannot be consistently or meaningfully quantiﬁed. However,
we would argue that with the exception of carefully controlled experimental arrangements,
the same holds for all systems – social, physical or hybrid. The reason lies in what ‘systems’
are. Any designation of a system, whether physical or social, is a designation of an
observable relationship among components; it is meaningful to refer to their relations as a
system, but this systematicity is an epistemic, and thus social, construct. We simplify by
attributing information from the complexity of the environment to the components. As
Niklas Luhmann’s ‘general systems theory’ (1995) argues, social systems qua systems are
inherently less complex than their environments; the virtue of a system is that it is less
complex than its environment – such is the difference between representations (i.e. models,
theories, etc.) and reality itself. In other words, systems are products of self-consciously
selected pieces of information from within an environment. Researchers must acknowledge
that a system’s selection is the result of contingent propositions; the system could have been
selected differently – and its behaviour would be seen to be different. After all, what
information to include, and what to ignore, constitutes much of any calculation regarding
natural hazard risk, and is the basis for any decision about parameterisation. Such con-
tingency entails its own internal risk, but reducing the representation of the system further so
as to ﬁt applied quantitative constraints exacerbates this contingency, and often prevents the
complexities of the environment from being explained in the system’s representation. This
can happen for practical reasons (e.g. calculability, resolution, etc.) or even ideological
constraints, as was the case with the application of ﬂawed ﬁnancial models leading to the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 and beyond (see, for example, Best, 2010; Crotty, 2009; Haldane and
May, 2011; McDowell, 2011).
Some recent social analyses go further than this, contesting any teleologically purposeful
system, basing their arguments for social emergence in complexity, nonlinearity and volatile
systems immanence. These argue that purely quantitative or purely qualitative means fail to
capture adequately how patterns of organisation successively transform the manifold
elements of the systems themselves, especially when these effects are as diffuse and
nebulous as the role of perception in affect, emotional contexts, political interest, tacit
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coercion, and so on (Coole and Frost, 2010: 14). Thus we must accept that any explanation
of social processes is only and always already partial, and can never be otherwise. This is not
to say, however, that what is said cannot be meaningful or useful, but the awareness of this
partiality means that careful description through multiple modalities is required to make
meaningful explanation and possible intervention in social systems.
In short, systems are representational simpliﬁcations; quantiﬁed systems (sometimes in
the form of numerical or computational models) are further simpliﬁcations still. While many
such quantitative representations are absolutely vital to understanding natural hazards
processes, attempting to argue that they are the most effective means of addressing,
communicating and equivocating hazards risk assessment is a gross error. The challenge
from social science to natural science lies in blending different forms of evidence and
methods of representation and analysis such that complexity and heterogeneity can be
preserved as much as possible in any description of a system and its interactions. Much of
what has been termed, not uncontroversially, the ‘post-normal science’ paradigm has
attempted to deﬁne just such ways and means of incorporating ‘social robustness’ into the
quality of scientiﬁc knowledge production (Petersen et al., 2011: 368; see also Turnpenny
et al., 2011). Indeed, as Stefan Hartmann (1999) argued, empirical adequacy and logical
consistency are not the only criteria for the acceptance of a model or even an explanation
about a system. The numbers that models generate need stories by which they can be
justiﬁed as valuable (a kind of ‘dequantiﬁcation’; see also Rademaker, 1982; Randall and
Wielicki, 1997). These stories guide and constrain the construction of models and explan-
atory systems by prescribing what should be accounted for, what should and should not be
taken into account, what the relevancies are for understanding a phenomenon and its
relationships among its various systemic aspects. The heterogeneities demanded by multi-
valent explanations (physical and social, say) of systems reveal that such stories constitute
the normative frameworks by which phenomena are modelled and come to be seen to have
explanatory value (Peschard, 2007: 166).
The importance of examining physical elements in close conjunction with the valuable
stories told via the social lenses is increasingly identiﬁed as a major research and management
priority in many risk assessment contexts. Examples from food and nanotechnology risks bear
this out. First, in the context of food risks, the Royal Society/FSA (2005: 6, 7) argue that
‘social scientists on risk assessment committees could help identify behavioural assumptions
that need to be taken into account in the assessment process’, and ‘a range of social science
techniques exist to support public engagement’. The report also notes that the risk assessment
committees involved in the study were not well aware of social science methods that could aid
in improving inclusiveness, equity and engagement. Similarly, in the context of new tech-
nologies, particularly nanotechnology, Macnaghten et al. (2005: 270) outlines a rationale and
process for building in social science insights into societal, technical, scientiﬁc and political
deliberations, based not on ‘critical’ engagement, but on ‘constructive, collaborative inter-
actions’. Klinke and Renn (2002, 2006) posit that a new form of risk analysis is needed for all
systemic risks, namely those ‘at the crossroads between natural events (partially altered and
ampliﬁed by human action such as the emission of greenhouse gases), economic, social and
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technological developments and policy driven actions’ (Klink and Renn, 2006: p. 2). They
argue that systemic socio-environmental or socio-technical risks cannot be reduced to the
classic risk components of hazard and probability. This new approach needs a broadened
evaluation of risk that gives attention to issues of inequity, injustice, social conﬂict and so on.
They also emphasise the importance of deliberation as a means of coping with uncertainty,
complexity and ambiguity, which is a theme explored more fully below.
Zinn (2010) calls for narrative and biographical approaches to be better integrated into risk
assessment, and reviews work on individual identity and experience in technological and
environmental risks. He argues that this ﬁeld of research potentially helps in understanding the
differences in people’s perceptions and responses to risk. Such work does not promise to lead
automatically to better environmental risk decision-making, but highlights that ‘decisions are
not just a matter of weighing up present day options or values, but rather are deeply rooted in
complex identity structures and social contexts, which evolve over time’ (p. 6).
Integration like this – of words and numbers, both of which are used as signiﬁers of ideas
or concepts – is a non-trivial challenge. It entails broad-scale discursive translation across
theoretical, empirical and methodological domains (Table 15.1 summarises some of the
interdisciplinary and integrative tools currently in development and use). Yet it is at the
juxtaposition of these often-contentious translations that both misunderstandings and oppor-
tunities for transformative understanding can occur. Progressive and domain-shaping
research depends on facilitating the dynamic interchange at these difﬁcult, shifting and
productive boundaries. Liverman and Roman Cuesta’s (2008) simple appeal for ‘a certain
level of tolerance and mutual understanding’ in such interdisciplinary interaction certainly
needs to be borne in mind, but as we will see later on, quite radical forms of knowledge-
theoretic description can emerge to change what counts as scientiﬁc explanation, evidence
and social accountability (Odoni and Lane, 2010; Whatmore, 2009).
In Section 15.3 we address these insights with some attention to how social science might
add to the description and explanation of natural hazards risks. Before that, we brieﬂy turn to
social conceptions of uncertainty.
15.2.4 Conceptualising uncertainty
The terminology for categories of uncertainty is – rather unhelpfully – often used in slightly
different ways in the social sciences than in the physical sciences, partly reﬂecting the
greater contingency and complexity of social phenomena. Here, we outline the three main
forms of uncertainty (epistemic, aleatory and ontological) and some of their conceptual
resonance within social science.
Epistemic, or systematic, uncertainty arises from a lack of knowledge, due to processes
that are unknown or inadequately understood, or the poor characterisation of variability. In
principle (indeed, by deﬁnition), obtaining more information about the system in question
reduces epistemic uncertainty. But in the socio-natural systems of concern to us, epistemic
uncertainty itself can never be eliminated, following the two arguments outlined above: ﬁrst,
516 S. Cornell and M. Jackson
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/3380127/WORKINGFOLDER/RSHR/9781107006195C15.3D 517 [502–547] 14.9.2012 8:01PM
knowledge is a processual and dynamic social product and not a ﬁxed quantity; and, second,
fundamental philosophical problems of perspectival framing and induction preclude deter-
minist or apodictic certainty from descriptive and predictive accounts. Indeed, a central
concern in many critical social science approaches today lies not with providing certainty
and indubitability about complex and open social processes, but with analysing the work
that speciﬁc processes do in the world, their staging and their effect. Providing certain
foundations for social knowledge has long been deemed impossible. The role of epistemol-
ogy now is not to provide such foundations, but to analyse how knowledge is produced and
enacted. From these post-foundationalist approaches, all knowledge is thus considered to be
inherently uncertain – but that does not mean that it is not rational, valuable or necessary. It
simply means that we commit ourselves to the everyday messy tasks of analysing its work,
application, politics and possibilities, and so see our epistemic task in less hubristic lights
than perhaps we once did.
Aleatory or stochastic uncertainty is related to the inherent variability of systems, includ-
ing their nonlinearity, randomness and contingency. Here, in principle, obtaining more data
on the system may assist in constraining or characterising its stochastic or probabilistic
elements, but it will not reduce this uncertainty. In the physical sciences, this improved
characterisation of variability has emerged as a priority for environmental modelling and
prediction (e.g. for climate, extreme weather events and other natural hazards). For the social
sciences, the interest lies less in prediction per se than in how prediction is mobilised as a
strategy for shaping human action and politics. The interest lies in how probabilities are
communicated, understood and enacted within the various social and political contexts in
terms of which they are deemed valuable or effective. Indeed, recent work on the rise of
probabilistic decision-making, strategic forecasting and contingency planning, especially
within deregulated market structures and the demise of the welfare state, have produced
trenchant critiques of the new forms of governmental strategies that have come to dominate
so much of social life (see, for instance, Beck, 1992; Dillon, 2010).
Ontological uncertainty is a term often taken as synonymous with aleatory uncertainty,
especially in economics (as described by Dequech, 2004), but it holds slightly different
resonance in other areas of social research, where uncertainty is not framed with the same
conceptions of probability. Ontological uncertainty relates to what the nature of the real
world is, not to knowledge about the real world. In social research, different ontological
characterisations of reality can be employed (the issues are clearly summarised by Blaikie,
1991). For most natural and physical scientists, the nature of the real (natural and physical)
world is the object of knowledge inquiry, and its reality is obviously not questioned in the
normal positivist empirical work that makes up ‘the scientiﬁc method’. In contrast, much
social research needs to recognise the subjectivity of social reality. Whether the observer
‘stands outside’ the social system of interest –universally deemed an impossibility by
contemporary social science – or is a participant within it, understanding the (real) nature
of the social involves interpretive or deliberative processes. Some social realities are socially
constructed (institutions, for instance), and they are not immutable. In such instances, it
makes little sense to think of ‘the inherent variability’ of the system.
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Several people have proposed classiﬁcations or taxonomies of uncertainty for social and
socio-environmental systems (e.g. van der Sluijs, 1996; van Asselt and Rotmans, 2002;
Regan et al., 2002; Meijer et al., 2006; Maier et al., 2008; Lo and Mueller, 2010). Broadly,
they all group the ‘kinds’ of uncertainty into two strands – epistemic and aleatory – that are
coherent with use in the bio-physical sciences. Morgan and Henrion (1990) and Rowe
(1994), in their typologies of uncertainty, identify human choice dimensions as important,
but in addressing how to deal with these issues in their articles they still propose more
reﬁned analysis and data acquisition, bringing these dimensions within the epistemic strand.
However, a consideration of human and social dimensions spotlights conceptual and
operational challenges in both strands of uncertainty. Human choice interferes with random-
ness, making characterisation of the variability problematic. It also has implications for the
knowability of future social processes. This was a pet issue for Popper (2002), both on
logical and moral grounds:
No scientiﬁc predictor – whether a human scientist or a calculating machine – can possibly predict, by
scientiﬁc methods, its own future results. Attempts to do so can attain their result only after the event.
[…] This means that no society can predict, scientiﬁcally, its own future states of knowledge.
(p. xiii)
But is it not possible to control the human factor by science – the opposite of whim? No doubt, biology
and psychology can solve, or soon will be able to solve, the ‘problem of transforming man’. Yet those
who attempt to do this are bound to destroy the objectivity of science, and so science itself, since these
are both based upon free competition of thought. Holistic control, which must lead to the equalization
not of human rights but of human minds, would mean the end of progress.
(p. 147)
Dequech (2004), in his critique of the socio-economic literature on uncertainty, argues
that, for these reasons and others, the epistemic and ontological aspects of the conceptual-
isation of uncertainty are ‘strongly entwined’. Because of human capacity to think, know
and act, knowledge about the world can change the nature of the world, as, in fact, the
material world agentially changes the nature, potential and capacities for human thought and
politics (Bennett, 2010). Socio-environmental systems are complex systems, and human
choice and agency are important factors in creating the complexity in the real world, while,
crucially also being created by it. The implication of this entwinement of knowledge about
the world and the actual agential nature of the material world is that obtaining more
analytical information about the issue will not reduce, characterise or constrain uncertainty
in domains of human choice and agency. Figure 15.2 shows an attempt to reinstate the
different ‘ﬂavour’ of uncertainty relating to the human world of choice and agency back into
the characterisation of socio-environmental uncertainty.
It is apparent that this idea is hard to grasp. Several scholars, including very eminent
thinkers, have written about the ‘cascade’ or ‘explosion’ of uncertainty, particularly in the
context of the assessment of societal risks from climate impacts (Wilby and Dessai, 2010;
Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis, 2007; Mearns et al., 2001; Moss and Schneider, 2000; Jones,
2000; Henderson-Sellers, 1993). Uncertainty in the decision-making process is represented
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(Figure 15.3) as expanding pyramids – implying a decision-tree analysis – or growing error
bars – implying a numerical error aggregation approach. As an example of the latter, Jones
(2000) states that ‘ranges are multiplied to encompass a comprehensive range of future
possibilities’. Wilby and Dessai (2010) take a decision-tree approach, saying ‘information is
cascaded from one step to the next, with the number of permutations of emission scenario,
climate model, downscaling method, and so on, proliferating at each stage’. Many of these
articles conclude that the escalation of these uncertainties hampers any sensible response.
For example, Wilby and Dessai state ‘the range (or envelope) of uncertainty expands at each
step of the process to the extent that potential impacts and their implied adaptation responses
span such a wide range as to be practically unhelpful’.
There are many conceptual problems with this approach. Not all of the ‘uncertainty steps’
in the cascade are multiplicative in nature, nor do all possible permutations of analysis and
intervention take place. However, human choices can manifestly reduce or even remove
uncertainty in some senses and contexts, and they are often given little recognition or
attention. Co-productive approaches can often mitigate and translate risks and hazards in
ways that address the resonance of uncertainties and their publics. It must also be noted,
however, as is evidenced with the recent ﬁnancial and banking crises between 2008 and the
present, human choices can increase and exacerbate uncertainties, often in deeply irrational
and sometimes catastrophic ways (Kahneman, 2011). Furthermore, the different kinds of
uncertainty are mixed up in these representations, so there are also operational problems
with the cascade idea. By bundling epistemic, aleatory and human-agency uncertainties
together as these authors do, activities to assess and manage the uncertainty cannot be
focused where they are needed. In particular, the uncertainty associated with human choices
cannot be dealt with by routines or rational analysis – it requires critical reﬂexivity and
Ontological uncertainty:
relates to the nature of the world
Epistemic uncertainty
due to
limited knowledge
obtaining more information
reduces uncertainty
Aleatory uncertainty
due to
inherent variability
obtaining more information
may characterise uncertainty
Human choice creates a purposeful system
information is contested; values are plural
‘obtaining more information’ is tangential
to the knowledge challenge
⇒
Figure 15.2 Uncertainty in socio-environmental systems.
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dialogue. A purposeful system (Checkland, 1999: 316–317) –which is what human systems
are – cannot be treated as if it were deterministic (the domain covered by epistemic
uncertainty), or even contingent (the domain of aleatory uncertainty). Later sections of
this chapter review how such systems may be dealt with more fully.
Why might we care about these semantics? Setting appropriate margins for the stochastic
uncertainty relating to the deterministic components of the risk problem, and adding informa-
tion about epistemic knowledge limitations are both vital but non-trivial components of the
advicemix for risk assessment. However, in responding to real-world environmental risks, the
provision of knowledge is not the whole picture. The stakeholders in this mix are diverse:
scientists, lobbyists, political decision-makers, media, advocacy groups and members of the
public all interacting and all with their own interests to serve. This is the motivation for
highlighting the human agency dimensions of uncertainty so prominently in this chapter.
15.3 Where social science matters
In this section we discuss some key areas where we feel social science matters: where
improved engagement across knowledge communities would beneﬁt environmental risk
Figure 15.3 Some representations of socio-environmental uncertainty from the literature. Note that the
‘cascades’ treat very different kinds of uncertainty (arising from models, empirical observations,
human choices) as if they were commensurate, quantitative/quantiﬁable, and unidirectional,
although choices can reduce as well as expand uncertainty.
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assessment and management, and where the take-up and integration of social research in
recent experimental approaches has already started to shape the knowledge-production
processes around natural hazards risk.
15.3.1 Relevance: deﬁning and framing risk assessment objectives
The uncertainty implications of a lack of engagement with social issues are potentially
serious for environmental risk management. Social science perspectives can elucidate some
of these potential dangers. A kind of ‘concept-blindness’ can arise, where essential elements
of the hazard are not seen or perceived (the infamous unknown unknowns), adding to risk.
There is also a linked problem of spurious precision, where lots of information is given
about just part of the issue. In risk management, if the risk assessment objectives are framed
too narrowly, and in particular, if the human and social dimensions are not considered
fundamentally within the process, there is an inability to respond to the ‘whole’ real risk.
Deﬁning the risks to people arising from natural hazards seems self-evidently to require
the involvement of a broad base of experts, yet in many contexts, there is still not enough
engagement of interdisciplinary expertise. There is a pervasive view that risk identiﬁcation
and responses have been ‘scientised’ (Bäckstrand, 2003; Ekberg, 2004). That is, the normal
methods of natural science – portrayed as a value-neutral, objective endeavour – are applied
to characterise and predict environmental problems, for a separate, downstream political
management response. Concerns are that this approach makes overly instrumental pre-
sumptions about how society works, and is insensitive to the potentially problematic nature
of the socio-political context in which responses are implemented. Many areas of the social
sciences invest a considerable amount of their time in considering the nature and implica-
tions of values and world-views in their investigations. Engaging in debates where this
activity is omitted is alien to their disciplinary culture. It also asks something of knowledge
production which it cannot give. Indeed, to assume that value-neutral, objective knowledge
is possible is not only epistemically naive, but it is often an ideological sleight of hand that
masks more than mere hubris. Knowledge is a product of communities of action and interest,
and our role as social scientists is to render as transparently as possible the various inner
workings of these communities, with the appreciation that our efforts too are themselves
situated and give a fundamentally partial account.
There is an extensive literature on what constitutes a community of understanding (or
epistemic community, as described by Haas, 1992), and signiﬁcant analysis into why the
earth sciences and social sciences operate so substantially in their own orbits (e.g. Demeritt,
2001; Nowotny et al., 2001). But when problems that require a decision about action, such
as responding to natural hazards, are framed in the limited terms of one discipline or
knowledge community, difﬁculties are known to arise (Owens, 2005; Petts and Brooks,
2006; Ricci et al., 2003). Here, we focus mainly on the interdisciplinary challenges.
Natural scientists deliver quantitative information on risk and uncertainty based on
process models, observations of hazards and statistical analysis of past hazards data.
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Quantitative risk assessments include some social data, such as demographic information,
housing inventories and so on, in the development of tools such as risk loss curves. This
detailed scientiﬁc and technical information is needed, but it is not sufﬁcient for informed
decision-making. Indeed, many factors in assessing risk and uncertainty are either unquan-
tiﬁable or little more than educated guesses, and simply attempting to include them in
quantitative models compounds a cascade of uncertainty and dilutes forecasting reliability
(Smil, 2003: 179). While more knowledge is usually better (Cox, 1999), the value of this
nuanced environmental understanding may in some cases be limited by the scientiﬁc
narrowness of the framing. A risk assessment needs to be accurate (true to the real world),
not just precise, and this requires an understanding of citizens’ needs, of political processes
and of wider public attitudes – all of which lie in the domain of ‘the social sciences’, but in
order to be useful, cannot remain isolated there. They need to be deployed in concert with
physical analysis, open to incorporation in knowledge-theoretic approaches too (see Odoni
and Lane, 2010).
At a strategic level, more deliberative working for risk analysis has been strongly
endorsed (HM Government, 2005a3, 2011; Royal Society/FSA, 2006; HM Treasury/DTI/
DfES, 2004; House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000; Stern and
Fineberg, 1996). Good-practice guidance abounds on engaging in such a deliberative
process (e.g. Renn et al., 1993; Stirling and Mayer, 2001; Petts et al., 2003; HM
Government, 2005b), but good practice seems only now to be emerging. Thus, it is at the
operational level that challenges still remain. What is the role of non-quantitative social
research in the decision-making process? How, for instance, should insights from history be
integrated? Clearly lessons can be drawn from the past (Kasperson and Kasperson, 2001;
Harremoës et al., 2002), but designing a future is not a straightforward intellectual exercise.
While there is a need for the integration of ethical, legal and social issues, the cultural and
epistemological differences between the relevant expert communities for these issues are
hardly less challenging than those between physical and social scientists.
There are some ﬁelds where theoretical debates are advancing well about new conceptu-
alisations of the interactions between environment and society and about the changing
nature of more socially engaged scientiﬁc research. These include ‘restored geography’
and sustainability science (Demeritt, 2001, 2008; Kates et al., 2001 – and further work since
then by several of that paper’s authors; Whatmore et al., 2008; and to some extent Hulme,
2008); and ecological economics (e.g. Costanza, 1991), although this emerging ﬁeld tends
to revert to numerical models as the ‘common language’. Another rapidly growing ﬁeld that
merits closer attention in the context of natural hazards and environmental risk is that of
socio-ecological systems and resilience (e.g. Young et al., 2006; Ostrom, 1997, Ostrom
et al., 2007; Folke, 2006, Liverman and Roman Cuesta, 2008). The conceptualisation of the
socio-environmental system explicitly considers people in their environment, and simulta-
neously considers the way that the environment shapes people. Analysing these relation-
ships requires assumptions and simpliﬁcations to be made about both society and the natural
3 These guidelines are currently being updated through a consultation process.
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world, so there is a strong focus on both analytic and deliberative methods for the ‘vali-
dation’ of models, metrics and indicators that combine or integrate components of socio-
environmental systems. Often, this requires a focus on different time and spatial scales to
those that apply to the physical hazards themselves. Such work includes, for example,
investigating the resilience of communities vulnerable to natural hazards and studying the
long-term impacts of a disaster.
Macnaghten et al. (2005) draw particular attention to a practical matter that we regard as
vital: uncertainty assessments need to be less sequentially and more collaboratively and
deliberatively constructed than they generally are at present. ‘Social science’ should not be
the end-of-pipe bolt-on to make the risk analysis more palatable or politic; cultural,
economic and societal dimensions should be part of the problem-statement stage, engaged
with at the outset. The research questions that are being asked will change as a result of
attending to the ways that complex social and political relationships constitute what counts
as evidence, to what ends data and ﬁndings are being put, to whom ﬁndings are directed and
who is excluded in such processes, and so on.
15.3.1.1 Upstream integration: the UEKC case
In this section we draw on the experiences of the interdisciplinary research project,
Understanding Environmental Knowledge Controversies, which proposed a methodolog-
ical apparatus for ‘mapping’ uncertain and contested science in the contexts of ﬂood
prediction, hydrological modelling and community-centred natural hazards risk assessment
(Whatmore, 2009). This endeavour, of course, did not map in the normal cartographic sense,
but developed an effort to expose and explore more explicitly, and sometimes experimen-
tally, the ‘entanglements of scientiﬁc knowledge claims with legal, moral, economic and
social concerns.’ Although this project shares many features with other action-oriented and
participatory socio-environmental risk research (e.g. Cobbold and Santema, 2008; Petts
et al., 2003), we use it as a case study because it had an explicit focus on uncertainty in
natural hazards and it documented its processes well, as well as its ﬁndings.
The three-year project, begun in 2007, examined the production and circulation of
environmental knowledge, and explored the ways in which knowledge controversies
could be productively utilised in the interests of public interdisciplinary science (Lane
et al., 2011: 16). The project focused on the science of ﬂood risk management, locating
much of its energies in the ﬂood-prone market town of Pickering in North Yorkshire, where
recent severe ﬂood events had let to the development of a proposed ﬂood defence plan,
which had met local resistance. The project’s objective was to analyse how new scientiﬁc
knowledge formations about ﬂood risk could arise through the integration of lay and
academic inputs, and shape different and more effective practices for ‘doing science’
about potentially divisive socio-natural issues (Lane et al., 2011: 17).
Core to the work of UEKC was the principle of experimentation through experience
(Lane et al., 2010: 24). The departure from the norm was that community engagement was
not seen as an ‘end-of-pipe’ phase following on from the scientiﬁc scoping and decision-
making process. Instead, the project supported the ‘upstream’ involvement of the
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community of interest in framing the ﬂood risk issue. In the ﬁrst instance, the project set up
what it termed an Environmental Competency Group, to collectively address the commun-
ity’s ﬂood risk. This group was made up of interested members of the local public,
academics, ﬂood-risk managers, a facilitator and recorders of the proceedings. They worked
together with the aim of learning about the local hydrological environment and, in doing so,
producing a collaborative description of the risk ecology and possible responses to it. The
representation of the hazard event emerged through negotiation among the Environmental
Competency Group in the recognition that ‘any attempt at representing the complex social-
economic-political composition of communities is itself an act of framing around a pre-
conceived notion of what that composition is’ (Lane et al., 2011: 24). The project team
emphasised ﬁve key aspects of this process, which it took to be distinctive in hazards risk
science (pp. 24–26). First, it focused on the practices of knowledge production, rather than
simply the results. Second, these practices manifested the risk research itself as an ongoing
and collaborative process. The knowledge contributions of the lay and academic partic-
ipants and the joint agency arising from the broad assemblage of people, places, techniques,
and objects shaped the nature of the science itself. Third, the collaborative process of ﬂood
risk assessment focused its attention through the various events which cascaded from the
collective experiences of the hazard. The result was that the ﬂood hazard itself was framed as
a multivalent event, through the various descriptions of ﬂooding, and the different com-
petencies of the actors involved. Fourth, rather than being narrowly deﬁned by amore-often-
than-not external academic view, the estimation of the risk was constituted by the collab-
orative and experiential narration of the hazard and its attendant consequences. The partic-
ipants thus came to recognise their shared responsibility for the hazard and its risk
assessment as an emergent property of the collaborative description with, ﬁfth, the result
that representation of the event also came to be shared as a responsibility of the community
of concern, rather than simply a dissociated matter for institutional actors (i.e. regulatory
bodies, advisors, etc.).
Through the iterative consultative processes, a more detailed qualitative understanding of
ﬂood-generating processes began to emerge. This multifaceted, locally informed under-
standing began to displace the earlier assessments made by the generalised hydrological and
hydraulic models that are the workhorses of the ﬂood risk management agencies. With the
integration of the iterative, qualitative understanding generated from the collaborative
consultative engagement, a new model emerged speciﬁc to the hydrological risk require-
ments of the local area. Termed the ‘bund model’ (see also Odoni and Lane, 2010), it and
other iterative models were the product of the Environmental Competency Group and
became scientiﬁc risk assessment objects through which the collective asserted its hazards
risk response and its competence (Lane et al., 2011: 26).
The UEKC involved collaboration across disciplines, bridging hydrology, human geog-
raphy, social theory, meteorology, social policy and rural economy. This brought multi-
dimensionality to understanding, but necessarily also demanded often contentious dialogue
and negotiation between the academic disciplines, regarding how problems were to be
deﬁned, framed, analysed and what actions brought to bear to address the risks. Findings
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from the UEKC and similar projects are now driving a transformation in risk assessment and
management methods, including views about who contributes to knowledge framing and
production, and the nature and desired robustness of evidence. Most importantly, in assess-
ing and managing the uncertainty in risk assessments, there is increasing attention to the
importance of a consideration of the dynamic, knowledge-transforming implications of
reﬂexivity (Romm, 1998) in these steadily more integrated modes of working (Lane et al.,
2011; Odoni and Lane, 2010; Whatmore and Landstrom, 2011).
15.3.1.2 Lessons for the framing of risk
What the UEKC project learned that became important to its risk analysis and response was
that rather than taking scientiﬁc knowledge as a given, new co-produced knowledge-
theoretic models emerged as collaborative products, which could be adjudicated according
to community-speciﬁc needs and understandings. The UEKC project argues that ‘the key
consequence of co-production’ (Lane et al., 2011: 31) is the ‘sense of knowledge’ produced:
What we experienced was a shift from taking knowledge as a given, to being able to see model
predictions as just one set of knowledge, against which they [i.e. interested residents] were entitled to
compare and to use their own knowledge.
This enables parties to arbitrate the claims regarding risk and uncertainty made using models
among their varied backgrounds of social knowledge. The value of these signiﬁcant
epistemic differences, as they are integrated into the predictive and descriptive scientiﬁc
capacities, is manifest in ‘better’ models – both in the immediate sense of having better
scientiﬁc representation of local ﬂooding processes (and reduced epistemic uncertainty),
and also in the broader sense of a co-developed, trustworthy and transparent model that
provided a focal point for the community’s engagement with the issues of ﬂood hazard.
Co-produced models thus become opportunities for innovative and targeted solutions for
speciﬁc hazard risk problems, which hold the potential to be more materially effective and
socially responsive than is now often the case (Odoni and Lane, 2010: 169–170).
However, this is not the way that knowledge is generally produced and transmitted.
Clearly, there are implications for the role of the scientist. Becoming engaged with resident
knowledge is a matter of collaborative trust. It is not simply a matter of unidirectional
scientiﬁc communication. As the UEKC experiments attest, trust, which lies at the purpo-
sive heart of risk and uncertainty science, is a function of social assemblages which co-
produce interested and speciﬁc strategies for decision-making and action. The purpose of
effective communication (trust, engagement, safety, enhancement of well-being) is situated
at the heart of the scientiﬁc process itself.
Establishing trust in models is not just about the restricted kind of validation implied by comparison of
predictions with data, but a wider set of practices through which a modeller makes a model perform.
(Lane et al., 2011: 32)
Deliberative, inclusive and participatory engagement is a lengthy and resource-intensive
process, but it is an effective means of managing uncertainty in contested socio-
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environmental decision-making (e.g. O’Riordan et al., 1999; Prell et al., 2007; Petts et al.,
2010). The necessary integrations – both across contributing academic disciplines and of
other contributory expertise – require new conceptualisations, shifts in the normal modes of
working, and a focused attention to the differences in worldview and ontology of the
different epistemic communities. This last need is often considered alien to ostensibly
objective, value-neutral scientists, although those working in practical ways in natural
hazards are usually well aware of the multi-dimensional real-world complexities and do
indeed reﬂect on their methods and ﬁndings in this context.
The UEKC project is not alone in its innovations, but there is still a great deal of scope for
exploring and documenting what appears to work well. Another valuable example of where
this has happened is the Trustnet-In-Action (TIA) network (trustnetinaction.com). TIA
began in 1997, and ended in 2006, as a European research initiative to ‘bring a fresh and
pluralist thinking’ to environmental risk decision-making, and to address the limitations of
the mainstream approaches to risk assessment and risk management. TIA documented their
emerging philosophy of inclusive governance (TIA, 2007), along with frameworks and
tried-and-tested patterns for inclusive, experimental deliberative processes:
[T]he TIA process is neither basic, nor applied research, but is close to research-in-action… which is,
strictly speaking, more explorative than conﬁrmative. TIA methodology is elaborated during the
process itself through the cooperative inquiry of experts and actors, with an undeniable part of
contingency. Its major contribution as a pragmatic methodology is to create the durable institutional
conditions for a process of governance which will place the actors in a position of inﬂuence. For that, it
is necessary to conceive a new role for the experts whose science must be dedicated to an ethical
objective of helping the actors to be subjects of their own life.
(TIA, 2007: 77)
In the next sections we step back from the lessons outlined from the UEKC and TIA
examples to address communication and social learning as commonly understood by risk
science, before returning again through the UEKC and related examples in the ﬁnal section
to address how co-productive efforts can help scientists meet the increasing calls for
involvement in political advocacy or policy-relevant action.
15.3.2 Comprehensibility and communication
Good communication is essential if the research products of any discipline are to be of any
value, and some insights from social research can be vitally important in improving the
communication and comprehensibility of complex messages associated with natural hazard
risks. Uncertainty in this context relates mainly to epistemic concerns –miscommunication,
misreadings of the hazard situation – and its management is therefore responsive to training
and technological investment.
Risk assessors routinely use concepts, mathematical techniques and probabilistic out-
puts – including uncertainty measures – that are often difﬁcult for decision-makers and the
public (and indeed other experts) to understand. And risk models are getting increasingly
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complicated. It is presumed that including more information in a risk model will not actually
worsen the risk estimates it produces, but there are trade-offs associated with increasing the
model complexity. As the numbers of model processes and parameters rise, the model may
yield better descriptive capacities, but there is also an increase in the number of uncertain
quantities needing to be estimated, and hence a rise in the overall uncertainties capable of
being contained within the model’s integrated system. Data paucity for model ‘validation’
(alert to Oreskes et al.’s (1994) objections to that term) is a problem dealt with elsewhere in
this volume, but it is clearly imperative to ensure that users and the multidisciplinary
co-developers of a risk assessment understand the models being used, and can communicate
the uncertainty issues and model limitations embedded in them.
There is a need to address both perceptual and cognitive issues (e.g. what meanings do
people give to particular words, concepts or images? How does this vary culturally?
Linguistically? How does experience affect the response to information?), and the more
technical/operational issues (how clear are the maps? Is information translated into local
languages? How can complex, multi-dimensional information be presented clearly? And so
on). The success of the latter often hinges on understanding of the former. Overall, there is
still comparatively little research in the area of natural hazards risk and uncertainty of how
comprehensible the information produced actually is. Research to date has largely focused
on socio-technical risks and – with a growing focus – on climate mitigation (e.g. Moss,
2007; Nowotny et al., 2001).
There have been some examples of natural science ‘overkill’ in the communication and
public understanding of science. For instance, a recent project (Public Awareness of Flood
Risk) funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council has investigated how the
Environment Agency’s ﬂood maps affect public awareness and attitudes to ﬂood risk (Clark
and Priest, 2008). It found that although the public generally like the online maps and
appreciated access to this kind of information, there were issues with managing people’s
expectations (and frustrations) about how speciﬁc the information might be to their own
situations. Like many other studies, this project also came across the problems associated
with people’s handling of complex and probabilistic information. Important concepts such
as return frequency or percentage likelihood are not well grasped by many members of the
public. More prosaically, users often found navigating the online maps to be a complicated
procedure, which detracted from their ability to access ﬂood information within the maps.
Over-elaborated hazards maps have previously been distributed widely in Guatemala at
times of volcanic threat, but communities and households were found to have inadequate
understanding of what the maps were meant to represent, and remained exposed to avoid-
able risks (W. Aspinall, pers. comm.). More fundamentally, little attempt was made, on the
part of scientists, to understand that the maps and their information were themselves highly
complex products of particular social contexts. They assumed representational strategies
and expectations, which in different social and cultural contexts might have very different
meanings to those intended. Sometimes this kind of complex information can be transmitted
better, with better effect: people in Montserrat living under threat of volcanic eruptions were
also found to have poor skills in map-reading, but when presented with three-dimensional
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visualisations of digital elevation data of their island, they demonstrated good spatial
awareness and were able to engage in discussions about their future in a more informed
way (Haynes et al., 2007). But it needs to be understood, in any risk communication
strategy, that the risk, its deﬁnition and its address all come from epistemic ‘genealogies’
and perspectives, which shape the knowledge and its applicability in particular ways. In the
instance of the hazard maps in Guatemala, had local citizens been involved in the production
of the hazard stories and their dissemination, the avoidance strategies embodied in the map
might have been more effective.
Having ensured that risk communicators have the necessary understanding of the poten-
tial knowledge production and transfer challenges, widened engagement requires the
targeting of audiences (e.g. Boiko et al., 1996), the development of mechanisms for stake-
holder or public dialogue (e.g. Rowe and Frewer, 2005) and the establishment of functional
communication structures (e.g. Cornell, 2006). The social sciences will not provide magic
bullets for environmental scientists engaging in hazard communication, but the tools of the
trade of social science, particularly qualitative research, are useful in these three stages.
Interviews, focus groups, community workshops, observant participation, ethnography,
language learning, archival analysis, deep involvement over long periods of time and
‘thick description’ all aid in framing effective and productive engagement. Applying the
good practice developed in social research to these socio-environmental hazard contexts can
help in assessing and reducing uncertainty. Indeed, several recent initiatives are attempting
to integrate qualitative knowledge forms that are dynamic within stakeholder and partner
communities into the parameterisations, structure and outputs of formal quantitative models
(e.g. Siebenhüner and Barth, 2005; TIA, 2007; the UEKC project: Lane et al., 2011; Odoni
and Lane, 2010; Whatmore and Landstrom, 2011). As these studies argue,
The practice of modelling… needs to move ‘upstream’ into ﬁelds and farms, community halls, pubs,
so that those who live with model predictions, and who have local knowledge to contribute, might
become involved in generating them, and so trusting them.
(RELU, 2010: 4)
A growing concern that merits more focused research is the interplay between risk, its
communication, inequity and social injustice. Mitchell and Walker (2003) reviewed the
links between the UK’s environmental quality and social deprivation, leading to an
Environment Agency research programme, Addressing Environmental Inequalities
(Stephens et al., 2007;Walker et al., 2007). Empirical evidence for environmental inequality
is still rather limited, even in the UK, so a key recommendation of this programme was to
engage in longer-term case studies, with a particular focus on cumulative or multiple
impacts. In the United States, Taylor-Clark et al. (2010) used Hurricane Katrina as a case
example through which to explore the consequences of ‘communication inequalities’,
ﬁnding that socio-economic position and the strength of social networks had a signiﬁcant
impact on both hearing and understanding evacuation orders. There is also international
research on communication and social justice in the context of climate adaptation and
mitigation. For example, Ford et al. (2006) carried out a study including information-
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exchange methods involving photography and voice recordings to explore how aboriginal
human rights can effectively be incorporated in environmental and science policy in the
Canadian Arctic. This study emphasised the value of community engagement in reducing
vulnerability, and has been part of a steady evolution of more publicly engaged Arctic
governance which has incorporated learning central to climate change impacts and miti-
gation, social and cultural resilience strategies, human rights legislations for environmental
protection and biodiversity preservation.
15.3.3 Behavioural change and social learning
Human behaviour is often a critical element determining the impact of socio-environmental
and socio-technical risks (OECD, 2009; Gardner and Stern, 2002): the volcanic eruption
would not be a problem but for the illegal farming on its slopes; the storm surge would not
cause such losses but for the beachfront hotel development boom, etc. Furthermore, human
behaviour can present risk assessors with a ‘catch-22’ situation: uncertainty, often linked to
social variability, can result in maladaption and accumulated or deferred risk. Reducing this
social uncertainty can be achieved, but only at the cost of a degree of ‘social engineering’ or
dictatorial action that is currently regarded as undesirable in democratic societies.
Thus, in risk research, interest has extended into the ﬁelds of human behaviour and the
processes of social change. Research that is relevant to natural hazard management comes
from economics, political science, psychology, management studies, healthcare and public
health, and increasingly from education for sustainable development, which brings an ethos
of empowerment and a concern for ideals and principles like human rights and sustainable
livelihoods. Exploring these research areas in depth is beyond the scope of this chapter;
instead, we select the following as illustrative challenges: ﬁrst, how knowledge affects
behaviour; second, the role of research in promoting social change as a means of achieving
risk reduction; and ﬁnally, the growing recognition that the interface between knowledge
and real-world action requires greater critical reﬂexivity, both in research and in governance.
15.3.3.1 Knowledge and human behaviour
As this volume indicates, the bulk of risk research has concentrated on technological and
environmental risks from a quantitative and analytic perspective. As capability has grown in
the prediction of the deterministic elements of risk, and the characterisation and representa-
tion of the contingent elements, attention has turned to the human elements that previously
were considered too subjective to address within this ‘objective’ assessment of risk.
Subjectivity, or an individual person’s perceptions of risk and concerns about it, is often
taken to be in opposition to ‘real’, objective risk, with the corollary that once adequate
objective knowledge is provided, people will align their perceptions to the objective assess-
ment. Throughout this chapter we have argued that the way to deal with the diversity of
human experiences, values and preferences is not to eliminate them from the analysis, nor to
attempt to bring them all into alignment, but to allow their multiplicity and often fraught
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negotiation to shape the landscape of the knowledge formation about the risks themselves.
Zinn (2010), in reviewing and promoting biographical research in the context of risk and
uncertainty, argues, like we do, that people’s personal identities and life experiences are an
important constitutive element in environmental risk analysis. Zin sets out the case for better
integration of individual experience and institutional processes into our understanding of the
management – and production – of risk and uncertainty.
The nub of the problem is that improving people’s knowledge about environmental risks
does not seamlessly improve people’s action in response to those risks. To begin with,
people are not purely rational beings. Irrationality and inconsistency are human traits,
and a large body of research in the area of risk and decision-making conﬁrms this (e.g.
Otway, 1992; Kahneman and Tversky, 1996; Kahneman, 2003). Adding to this, people are
exposed to many risks and opportunities simultaneously, and are always seeking
some kind of life balance – ‘an equilibrium of their experiences, abilities and feelings’
(TIA, 2007: 25). To the extent that people do rationalise their decisions, the way that they
may weight these different risks and opportunities in some kind of multiple optimisation
algorithm will vary from person to person, and from context to context. In addition,
an individual’s scope to respond to risk and uncertainty is constrained by their social
context.
In what can be considered the ‘ﬁrst wave’ of cognitive and behavioural research in the
context of environmental risks, the focus was on improving the understanding of individual
interpretations (or misinterpretation) of risk in order to improve risk models. Often, this
involved comparing lay people’s ‘mental models’ or perceptions of an environmental hazard
with those of experts (e.g. Pidgeon et al., 1992; Atman et al., 1994; Fischhoff, 1998). These
mental models are efforts to map out the causalities and dependencies in a hazardous
process. Essentially, the divergences between lay and expert perspectives were taken as a
dimension of the risk model uncertainty, which could be corrected in a more efﬁcient version
of the risk model, or mitigated by changing the model of risk communication: by knowing
better what people do not know, or do not understand, the risk manager is enabled to better
direct people’s behaviour towards a rational decision.
This body of research did indeed improve risk communication, but what it really high-
lighted was the complexity of the ways in which individuals construct and experience their
social reality, and the extent to which they rely on strategies of social learning. Rational
responses to (perceived) short-term or local risks may cause a higher exposure to other risks;
people are unwittingly complicit in their own risk exposure (examples are listed in theWorld
Disasters Report, 2009: 19). This interplay between responding to risk and altered exposure
is at the root of potential moral hazard (e.g. Cutter and Emrich, 2006; McLeman and Smit,
2006; Laffont, 1995) and societal maladaptations (Niemeyer et al., 2005; Brooks et al.,
2009) resulting from human behaviour change. These concepts have already received
attention in some risk areas, notably in ﬂood risk and the agriculture/agrochemicals context,
but are less articulated across other important natural hazards, where more attention to
policy analysis and the broader political economy is required.
530 S. Cornell and M. Jackson
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/3380127/WORKINGFOLDER/RSHR/9781107006195C15.3D 531 [502–547] 14.9.2012 8:01PM
Slovic (2001: 1, 5) illustrates the shift to the ‘second wave’ of behavioural risk research,
in which a greater emphasis is given to people’s life-experience within the risk deﬁnition
process:
Ironically, as our society and other industrialized nations have expended this great effort to make life
safer and healthier, many in the public have become more, rather than less, concerned about risk. […]
Research has also shown that the public has a broad conception of risk, qualitative and complex, that
incorporates considerations such as uncertainty, dread, catastrophic potential, controllability, equity,
risk to future generations, and so forth, into the risk equation. In contrast, experts’ perceptions of risk
are not closely related to these dimensions or the characteristics that underlie them.
One goal of these new approaches is not just to understand the perceptions of risk held by
people living in a hazard situation, but also to obtain a better understanding of how and why
people develop their world-views, identities, preferences and behaviours (e.g. Zinn, 2010;
Henwood et al., 2010). The subject is not an abstract ‘rational’ person, but a ‘concrete
person who articulates and adapts the multiple dimensions of his or her identity, personality
and existence’, who in turn is rooted in a community in close interaction with a speciﬁc
cultural and natural environment (TIA, 2007). This is a much more dynamic engagement
with people as the subjects of research. It potentially confers a much richer understanding of
the extent to which risk and uncertainty matter to people in their everyday lives, including
the ebbs and ﬂows of concern about risk that so profoundly affect people’s practical
responses to risk situations.
15.3.3.2 Social learning and social change
In the light of the recognition that individual knowledge and perceptions of risk and
uncertainty are shaped by social interactions, there is growing attention to social responses
to environmental risk.
The ﬁrst dimension of this body of work that we want to highlight relates to society’s
response to the provision of information about risk. The questions of why and how a speciﬁc
risk becomes a public social issue – or sometimes does not – are among the most perplexing
challenges in risk assessment. Very often, these responses contrast sharply with the rational
responses as assessed by technical risk experts. For example, people’s agitated concern
about the triple Measles–Mumps–Rubella vaccine in the UK was a regular feature in the
news headlines for nearly a decade since the ﬁrst suggestion of a link with autismwas raised,
despite a technically very low risk (Cassell et al., 2006). In contrast, inhabitants of the
volcanic island of Montserrat were found to make frequent incursions into the danger zone
during red-alert periods when risk was manifestly high (Haynes et al., 2007). Impacts on
society and the economy can be profound, whether the social response to the risk is ‘duller’
and more attenuated than it should be, or is more heightened and ampliﬁed.
Kasperson et al. (1988) set out a conceptual framework for the ‘social ampliﬁcation of
risk’ that has proven very useful in bridging our understandings of risk perception and risk
communication. Using the analogy of signal ampliﬁcation in communications, they high-
light the diverse ‘signal processors’ (such as risk scientists, risk management institutions, the
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media, peer groups and activists), and identify various stages in the ampliﬁcation or
attenuation of the risk information, including the selective ﬁltering of (comprehensible)
information; the use of ‘cognitive heuristics’ – conceptual short-cuts deeply embedded in
the human psyche that are deployed to simplify complex problems; and of course, the
multiple social interactions and conversations people engage in, to contextualise and
validate their interpretations, and to collectively decide how to respond to the risk. Since
then, others have looked at the phenomenon of ‘herd behaviour’ (including panic responses)
and the role of information cascades in general socio-economic risks (e.g. Gale, 1996;
Kameda and Tamura, 2007). In the socio-environmental context, Pidgeon et al. (2003) have
reviewed the empirical and theoretical research on the social ampliﬁcation of risk frame-
work, which now addresses formal and informal information channels, the issues of
individual understanding and behaviour already described above, and the behaviour-
shaping forces in society – attitudes, political dynamics, social movements and so on.
In the climate context, there is a growing focus on the issues of the positive diffusion of
knowledge in adaptation processes (e.g. Pelling and High, 2005; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007; Ebi
and Semenza, 2008; Jabeen et al., 2010; Mercer, 2010), also evidenced in the large numbers
of non-governmental organisations that are particularly alert to their role as ‘communities of
practice’, building the capability for accelerating and cross-fertilising knowledge ﬂows into
vulnerable populations. Clearly, knowledge diffusion is a requisite step in moving from
individual to social learning and societal change. However, social learning based on
collective memory of previous experiences is only adequate when deviations from the
baseline situation are modest. When risks have high consequences (as in many natural
hazards), or when new developments or requirements emerge (as in the case of climate
change), then there is a need for society to change more radically or fundamentally – perhaps
to a situation with no historical or geographic analogue – to avoid the worst consequences.
Decision-making under these circumstances becomes a complex matter. The idea of ‘con-
scientization’ (Freire, 2005) involves a kind of critical consciousness of the world linked to
action to resolve the perceived difﬁculties. It has been a helpful concept in health (Kilian,
1988; Cronin and Connolly, 2007), and features increasingly in environmental change
(Kuecker, 2007), partly because it is alert to the frequent internal contradictions and
‘wickedness’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) of real-world problems.
15.3.3.3 Reﬂexivity in research and governance of risk
The limitations of risk science, the importance and difﬁculty of maintaining trust, and the subjective
and contextual nature of the risk game point to the need for a new approach – one that focuses upon
introducing more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision-making in order to
make the decision process more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of technical analysis,
and increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of the resulting decisions.
(Slovic, 2001: 7)
There are many mechanisms for changing people’s individual and social behaviours in the
face of environmental risk. These include incentives, regulation and, of course, persuasion
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and education. But the idea that experts of any discipline should actually deliberately try to
change the values and beliefs that drive behaviour patterns, changing social norms, is loaded
with ethical and political tensions. There is a delicate balance to be maintained. Knowledge,
when available, should clearly shape action, but simply providing information about risks
and uncertainty does not automatically lead to an optimal change of action. The role of the
scientist in driving social transformations clearly requires attention, care and –many argue –
new forums.
The role of the scientist in governance is therefore also a growing research ﬁeld in its own
right. Patt and Dessai (2005) and Grothmann and Patt (2005), operating in the climate
adaptation context, have looked at the role of experts and the effect of uncertainty in expert
assessments on citizens’ choices in response to perceived risks. It is essential but not
necessarily sufﬁcient to follow good practice in risk communication, and deliver training
in technical or cognitive skills to those receiving the complex messages of environmental
risk assessment. Marx et al. (2007) distinguish between analytic versus experiential learn-
ing, and argue that both can and should be developed through participatory processes, to
actively engage the public in the processes of risk assessment and management. There is a
broad consensus that social learning interventions for environmental risks require trans-
parent procedures (after all, research into people’s complicity in environmental disasters is
potentially a delicate task), iterative cycles and oversight by individuals or agencies with no
perceived strongly vested interests. Collins and Ison (2006: 11) propose a list of ‘systemic
variables’ that need attention if changed understanding and practices are needed, demon-
strating that the integration of social science techniques is proving valuable as scientiﬁc
research and risk assessment processes are opened to greater public scrutiny:
The variables are: an appreciation of context; ecological constraints or conditions; institutional and
organisational framings and practices; stakeholders and stakeholding; and appropriate facilitation.
How a messy situation is understood and progressed with regard to these key variables is likely to
determine the extent to which social learning can enable concerted action to emerge from changes in
understandings and practices.
Ethical dilemmas clearly arise in this kind of ‘messy situation’, and researchers and risk
managers are beginning to give them more explicit consideration. Pidgeon et al. (2008)
explore the ethical issues associated with socio-cultural studies in risk research. These relate
to the power asymmetry associated with expertise; the impact of the knowledge provided (or
the process of information elicitation) on the participants; the repercussions for institutions
involved, which may have their validity and authority questioned in the process of engage-
ment, and so on. As they clearly state, there is no simple formula for dealing with these
ethical challenges. Along with the other ‘human dimensions’ of multi-dimensional risks,
they require places and times to be provided for deliberation and reﬂection.
Reﬂexivity has already been mentioned several times in this chapter. We draw on Romm
(1998), Macnaghten et al. (2005), Doubleday (2007) and Scoones et al. (2007), who have
translated the ideas of reﬂexivity from general social theory into the context of environ-
mental risk and governance. Reﬂexivity involves a sensitivity to inputs from diverse
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perspectives, consciously recognising that there are alternative ways of seeing issues of
concern. It involves a deliberate consideration of whether all the necessary voices are
present, and are being listened to. It is a recursive and multi-directional activity of critical
(and self-critical) thought and dialogue, taking place throughout the process. Since persua-
sion and the promotion of social change are often at the heart of responses to socio-
environmental risks, there is a need for particular self-awareness on the part of the expert/
researcher, at the stage of information provision, and during the negotiations that lead to the
transformation. This should not be regarded as navel-gazing; it is part of the process of
accounting for researchers’, risk managers’ and indeed all participants’ involvement in the
processes that shape or steer society. Reﬂexivity involves opening up the tacit assumptions,
exposing the whole ‘risk knowledge process’ to public scrutiny, and as exempliﬁed in the
UEKC studies, involving those publics in the co-production of the knowledge base for
societal action.
Because socio-environmental risks are characterised by a high degree of complexity, the
process of change often needs to be provisional and adaptive, in the ﬁrst instance. But
through an experimental and iterative encounter premised on building trust competencies,
the reﬂexive process provides the means for a structural pausing-for-thought, accommo-
dates uncertainty and complexity into research design and output, and can result in radical
transformations to how and what scientiﬁc knowledge is produced (Lane et al., 2011: 33),
and for whom it becomes meaningful with ‘the objective of helping the actors to be subjects
of their own lives’ (TIA, 2007: 77).
15.4 Conclusion: understanding scientiﬁc action
In this concluding section we reﬂect brieﬂy on the fact that research in natural hazards has a
dual motivation: to develop greater understanding of our environment, and to inform real-
world action. Activismmay be a strong or unpalatable term for some. Researchers, however,
are increasingly being turned to for more than pure knowledge. They are being asked to
deliver real-world results with policy impacts that can demonstrably be seen to affect
economic and social outcomes. Such demands are often a very far cry from labs and ﬁeld
research, let alone much of the formal education histories of the researchers and their teams.
Some of this expectation is the result of misunderstandings on the part of those calling for
such applications (politicians, policy-makers, business leaders and the media), of the power
of predictive modelling to forecast future climate or related earth surface events. Indeed, one
of the risks of predictive modelling is that it can lend itself to such misappropriated expect-
ations. However, it is also the case that public and publicly accountable bodies enshrine in
their own prospects and responsibilities for scientists beyond those of mere objective
description.
The framing of risk research in terms of promoting societal objectives is a relatively recent
phenomenon. A decade ago, the Phillips Report (2001) on bovine spongiform encephalop-
athy emphasised precise demarcations of the scope and relevance of scientiﬁc expertise for
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the advisory panel, making a sharp distinction between the science and policy domains. This
contrasts markedly with the UK Chief Scientiﬁc Advisor’s 2005 guidance on evidence for
policy (HM Government, 2005a), which presses for wider public dialogue in cases of
uncertainty over risks to human well-being or the environment, and emphasises the need
for scientiﬁc input to be embedded in departmental policies and practices. To facilitate this
process, most UK government departments have appointed a scientiﬁc advisor, often
supported by advisory panels. The unprecedented collaborative partnership among UK
research councils and government departments that the research programme Living with
Environmental Change represents is predicated upon improved ongoing dialogue among
research funders, researchers and government stakeholders, explicitly ‘to provide for sig-
niﬁcant impact on policy and practice’ (NERC, 2009).
In its report on science in the public interest, the Royal Society (2006: 10) likewise argues
that the ‘research community… needs to shoulder two main responsibilities with respect to
the public. The ﬁrst is to attempt an accurate assessment of the potential implications for the
public.… The second is to ensure the timely and appropriate communication to the public of
results if such communication is in the public interest’. While the former is evidence of good
ethical practice, the latter is more difﬁcult to implement. We have spoken already of
communication, but it is interesting to note that the Royal Society qualiﬁes what it means
by ‘appropriate communication’ to include ‘indicators of uncertainty in the interpretation of
results; expressions of risk that are meaningful; and comparison of the new results with
public perceptions, “accepted wisdom”, previous results and ofﬁcial advice’ (Royal Society
(2006: 11).We suggest that the social scientiﬁc insights that have been indicated in brief thus
far, and perhaps as they manifest in the actual co-production of scientiﬁc knowledge in
projects like the UEKC initiative, go a long way to addressing how natural hazards risk
science can meet the Royal Society criteria of ‘interpretive’, ‘meaningful’ and integrative
with other forms of knowledge and understanding.
It is thus not beyond the scope of this chapter to suggest that if natural hazards scientists
were to implement truly interdisciplinary research co-production strategies around haz-
ards risks and their uncertainty communication, like those exempliﬁed by the UEKC
project, neither the reticence about advocacy nor the loss of scientiﬁc privilege should be
signiﬁcant issues. Meaningful co-development of knowledge and communication of
issues and their uncertainties would be built in from the start. Of course, for each speciﬁc
project, the co-production strategies would differ, and some hazard situations might
require a different balance of conventional scientiﬁc input than others. But adopting the
principle of meaningful and relevant knowledge production in forms that better meet the
challenges of accountability, transparency and impact would bring profound changes to
risk management. Action, agency and – at least to some extent – political engagement
would become explicit, and importantly, would be negotiated parts of the scientiﬁc
method, whereas today these aspects might largely remain implicit. Hazards scientists
should therefore, by all means, consider the extent to which they inform and shape action,
and the means by which they do so.
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We have, in this chapter, identiﬁed three broad challenges for uncertainty analysis in the
natural hazards context. These are:
* Expanding the need for interdisciplinary working to understand the interactions between
the natural and human systems that occur in emergencies and disasters.
* Involving a much wider range of knowledge inputs from the communities of interest (who
bring important contributory, experiential expertise) and the academic social sciences
(such as psychology, ethics, law, sociology and history, in addition to the more expected
economics and political science).
* Developing theoretical and conceptual approaches that combine or integrate components
of socio-environmental systems to produce knowledge-theoretic assemblage models for
hazards risk analysis.
Expanding the networks and involving and developing new knowledge contributors
within the scientiﬁc co-production processes demands an awareness of the many interrelated
social and institutional contexts of natural hazards themselves, including their research. In
turn, this requires that we focus on different time and spatial scales to those that apply to the
physical hazards themselves, for the risks and uncertainties are themselves emergent proper-
ties of the socio-natural systems that face the hazards. As we have noted throughout, risk
management in some sectors and domains already does this well. Notably, Europe’s
responses to ﬂood risk have integrated social and political dimensions over the last one or
two decades, with river basin and coastal cell management structures involving strategic
trans-boundary and multi-administration partnerships in most countries.
Perhaps the greatest challenges, though, are those relating to the translation of knowledge
to explicitly political action. The ﬁrst is the building up of effective engagement with
stakeholders of risk and uncertainty in natural hazards, starting with identifying who they
are and what they need. The next, and arguably the most demanding, is the internal and
cultural shifts that many scientists may need to face, as their societal role develops from
‘detached investigator’ to participant-observer or indeed activist.
Throughout this chapter we have emphasised that the co-production of knowledge –
including the deﬁnition of risk and the identiﬁcation and management of its uncertainty –
emerges through the activity of an assemblage or interacting dynamic system of humans
(who can think, make choices and act on them) and non-human factors. Scientiﬁc action (or
any action for that matter), write Callon and Law (1995: 482), ‘including its reﬂexive
dimension that produces meaning, takes place in hybrid collectives’. The action is the
product of the assemblage as a whole, and cannot be isolated in any one part. The elements
that make up the collective expression of scientiﬁc knowledge production are an almost
endless list: the hazardous events, risk scientists, related academics, lay people, policy-
makers, administrators, natural processes, models, technical instruments, workshops, com-
munication devices, maps, photographs, stories, museums, etc. Viewed in this way, the
emergence of action and agency from these socio-natural assemblages goes some consid-
erable way towards distributing responsibility and representation, in instances of activism
and advocacy, from the locus of ‘the scientist’ to the co-productive system. We view this as
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an exciting development, in that increasingly literate and engaged publics, enrolled in their
own enabling forms of scientiﬁc agency and self-understanding can shape, in speciﬁc but
translatable ways, the social and natural meanings relevant to their lives, and their interre-
lated ecologies.
What we need to explore now is how this wide, powerful and interested socio-natural
assemblage, different in each case and speciﬁc to particular social, cultural, political and
environmental contexts, can be understood in its entirety – theoretically and methodolog-
ically. And we need to understand better how it can be asked, as a collective, to co-produce
scientiﬁc understanding for hazards and their impacts. Social science has an integral role to
play in the opening up of this new and potentially radical scientiﬁc method. We hope we
have shown how it is already shaping the future of the risk research landscape.
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